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INTRODUCTION

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)' was enacted by Congress in
1980 during the infancy period of the United States' environmental
policies. This Act makes owners and operators of contaminated
hazardous waste sites, and the transporters and manufacturers of
hazardous waste, potentially responsible parties (PRPs) liable for
the cleanup of any contamination. The Act created the "Superfund" and allowed the government to use these resources to
facilitate the remediation of hazardous waste sites. The executive
branch was granted the right to bring suit under CERCLA to3
recover the expense of clean up to reimburse the "Superfund.
The primary objective of the Act was to create a prompt method to
cleanup hazardous waste sites and to assign liability to the parties
responsible for the contamination.
Starting in the early 1980s, individuals and corporations
became environmentally responsible and conscious. Some PRPs
under CERCLA began to facilitate their own voluntary cleanup of
hazardous waste sites.4 Voluntary PRPs incurred large cleanup
costs because they chose to clean up their sites quickly and
efficiently rather than wait for the government to compel or facilitate a cleanup. 5 These voluntary cleanups supported the end goal of
CERCLA, which is the cleanup and removal of hazardous waste
sites. The courts at that time recognized the great responsibility
and expense incurred by a voluntary cleanup, and created a remedy

'42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2002).
2

See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2002).

3id.
4 See United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1265-69 (Del.

1986); see also United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,
260-62 (D.C. Mo. 1985); Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp.
913, 914 (N.D. Okla. 1987).
5See, e.g. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 164 (2004).
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in CERCLA § 1076 to give
PRPs the right to recover some costs
7
from other liable parties.
This right to recover is most analogous to a common law
contribution action. The right of contribution exists when a
tortfeasor has "discharged the entire claim for the harm by paying
more than his equitable share of the common liability" and is then
allowed to recover from other tortfeasors their shares of the
common liability.8 The courts created this contribution right for
those PRPs that would voluntarily incur the complete costs of
remedying a hazardous site, and the right allowed just results and
an incentive to those that cleaned up the sites. 9 The district court in
United States v. New Castle County1° found a right to contribution
enhances CERCLA by encouraging expeditious action and protecting the Superfund's financial resources. 1 Without this right to
contribution, many PRPs would likely wait for government action
rather than conducting voluntary cleanups without any economic
remedy.
In 1986, Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA), which included an express contribution section.' 2 Courts adopted CERCLA § 11313 as a mechanism
for the court-determined contribution right in § 107.14 Some courts

642

U.S.C. § 9607 (2002).

7 See

New Castle, 642 F. Supp. at 1256-69; Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.

Supp. at 260-62; Sand Springs Home, 670 F. Supp. at 917-19.
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

886A(2) (1979).

9 See New Castle, 642 F. Supp. at 1256-69; Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. at 260-62; Sand Springs Home, 670 F. Supp. at 917-19.
'0 New Castle, 642 F. Supp. at 1258.
" See id. at 1268-69.
12See 42
13 42

U.S.C. § 9613 (f)(1) (2002).

U.S.C. § 9613 (2002).
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held that PRPs were precluded from bringing a direct action under
§ 107 and thus had to file a § 113 claim.' 5 Many courts used a joint
claim under both sections to allow PRPs to recover from other
parties that contributed to the contamination of hazardous waste
sites.16 Eighteen years after the passage of SARA, it appeared that
much of the law regarding CERCLA contributions was settled.
However, in December 2004, the Supreme Court's decision17
in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. ("Aviall")
drastically altered the ways a PRP could seek contribution. It made
clear that § 113 only applied to a narrow subset of PRPs that had
first been pursued by a government claim.' 8 The Supreme Court
held that a PRP that voluntarily cleans up a hazardous waste site,
without compulsion from or settlement with the government,
cannot then sue other liable parties to recover their costs from the
cleanup under § 113.19 This decision removed from CERCLA
litigation the best PRP plaintiffs, those that choose to clean up
before government intervention. After Aviall, many PRPs refrained
from cleaning up hazardous sites because they no longer have a
means to recover costs from other liable parties. PRPs should be
encouraged to conduct voluntary cleanups of hazardous sites, not
punished by removing their cause of action.

See Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301-02
(9th Cir. 1997).
14

"5 See Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d at 1301-04; United Techs. Corp. v.
Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d. 96, 103 (1st Cir. 1994); see also New Castle
County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1120-24 (3d Cir. 1997); see
also Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11 th
Cir. 1996); see also Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764-65
(7th Cir. 1994).
16

See Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 924 (5th Cir.

2000) (holding that the Fifth Circuit framed its § 113 claim as a type of § 107
claim).
17

8

Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
Id. at 171.
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Part I. further discusses the background of this issue. Part
II. A. of this article discusses the purposes underlying CERCLA,
and the importance of allowing PRPs that conduct voluntary
cleanups to further those purposes. The Aviall Court's decision
places a chilling effect on voluntary cleanups and discourages
prompt cleanup and assignment of liability. The Second Circuit in
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc.
("Con Ed") 20 relied on pre-SARA precedent and determined that
the purposes behind CERCLA warrant that PRPs be allowed to
bring actions for cost recovery. 2 Part II. B. analyzes the plain
language of § 107 and argues that this plain language of "any other
person ' 22 encompasses PRPs. Courts have disagreed whether the
right encompassed in § 107 is an express right of cost recovery or
an implied right of contribution. 23 However, the courts agree that
the importance of the right is the driving force in allowing a PRP
to seek a § 107 claim.
Part II. C. focuses on the main argument against allowing a
PRP to bring suit under § 107. Since the enactment of CERCLA,
courts have used joint and several liability under § 107 to allow the
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to efficiently bring suit against a single tortfeasor. 24 Some courts believe
that this joint and several liability will create unjust results when
allowing a culpable PRP to bring suit against another PRP. 25

20

Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005).

This was the first circuit to address the issue post-Aviall.
21

See id. at 100; see also Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United States, 435 F. Supp.

2d 1136 (Kan. 2006); see also Viacom, Inc. v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 2d 3,
9 (D.C. 2005).
22

42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2002).

23

See, e.g., Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994).

24

See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (D.C. Ohio

1983).
25

See Elementis Chromium L.P. v. Coastal States Petroleum Co., 450 F.3d 607

(5th Cir. 2006).
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However, advocates of allowing PRPs to bring cost recovery suits
under § 107 argue that defendant PRPs may simply file a § 113
counterclaim because the post-Aviall requirements of a civil suit
have been met. 26 This counterclaim would remove any possibility
of unjust results and assign the appropriate costs to each tortfeasor.
Part II. D. analyzes the savings clause and legislative history
behind § 113 and shows that the section did not diminish any preexisting contribution right found within CERCLA. 7 Therefore, the
pre-SARA judicial right of contribution remains available for PRPs
to bring contribution actions. 28 This pre-SARA right shall only
apply to PRPs that would be liable under § 107(a) if sued, but are
currently unable to bring a contribution action under § 113(f).29
This Article will only involve PRPs that fall under this definition,
because those PRPs that can presently bring suit under § 113
should do so under that judicially-settled section of CERCLA.
Aviall left PRPs with five unanswered questions: 1) whether a PRP can "recover costs under § 107(a)(4)(B)"; 30 2) whether
a PRP may "pursue a § 107(a) action for joint and several
liability"; 3 1 3) whether a PRP may "pursue a cost recovery action
under § 107(a) for some form of liability other than joint and
several"; 32 4) whether there is "an express or implied right of contribution under § 107(a)"; and 5) whether there is "any judicially
implied right of contribution [that] survived the passage of

26

See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 100 (2d

Cir. 2005).
27

See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004).

28

See Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1151 (Kan.

2006).
29

See Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 97.

30 Brief in Opposition at 3, UGI Utils., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., No.

05-1323 (U.S. filed June 2, 2006).
31

id.

32

id.
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SARA. 3 3 Currently, the circuit courts are split as to whether a
PRP is allowed to recover under § 107, 34 and on remand the
Northern District Court of Texas denied Availl's § 107 claim. 35 To
revive these § 107 claims, courts should hold that PRPs, precluded
from actions under § 113, should be allowed to recover costs under
§ 107's express language that allows cost recovery claims because
it furthers the purposes of CERCLA. However, if courts are not
persuaded that § 107 contains an express right for PRPs, it should
still fashion a remedy. The remedy of implied contribution stems
from the right created by pre-SARA courts and § 113's savings
clause.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Pre-SARA Precedent

Congress enacted CERCLA in an era when it created many
environmental statutes, based on a general need to protect the
public and the environment from hazardous waste and other
pollutants. CERCLA gives the government power to clean up
hazardous waste sites using money from the "Superfund" created
by Congress. 36 After a government cleanup, the government may
then bring a cost recovery action under § 107 that would replenish

33 Id.

Compare Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 100, and Ati. Research Corp. v. United
States, 459 F.3d 827, 837 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 1144 (Jan 19,
2007) (No. 06-562) with E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co. v. United States 460
F.3d 515, 528-31 (3d Cir. 2006) (following Third Circuit precedent in New
Castle County, 111 F.3d 1116 at 1120-24, and In re Reading Co., 115 F.3d.
1111, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997) denying PRPs a right to bring suit under §107
because no express statutory language or legislative history grants PRPs this
right).
34

See Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., LLC, 2006 WL 2263305, 10 (N.D.
Tex 2006).
35

36

42 U.S.C. § 9604 (2005).
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the fund.3 7 Section § 107 also provides for cost recovery actions by
private parties who have incurred cleanup costs of hazardous
waste. 38 During CERCLA's infancy, courts were left to determine
what liability to impose under these cost response actions. The
court in Chem-Dyne Corp. chose joint and several liability.39 This
joint and several liability benefitted the EPA because it allowed the
agency to pick and choose its defendants; however, joint and
several liability caused problems when one PRP sued another PRP.
To fix this problem of liability, many courts found an
implied right of contribution in § 107.40 These courts determined
that Restatement Second of Torts § 886A governed these actions
where a PRP had incurred more than its share of the costs of
cleanup. 4 1 This Restatement governs joint tortfeasors, and states
that it applies when one has paid more than his equitable share and
multiple persons become liable for the same harm.4 2 This right to

contribution is appropriate in these circumstances because it
motivates responsible PRPs which conduct cleanups by allowing
them to recover a portion of their costs that were a result of
another's actions.
Other courts, while not explicitly finding an implied right
of contribution, determined that a PRP can bring a direct cost
recovery action under § 107 against another PRp. These courts

31

§ 9607 (a).

38 § 9607 (a)(4)(B).
39

See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (D.C. Ohio

1983).
40

See United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. at 1256-69; see also

United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 260-62; see also Sand
Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913, 917-19 (N.D. Okla.
1987).
41

Sand Springs Home, 670 F. Supp. at 917.

42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 886A(2) (1979).

See Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 890-92 (9th Cir.
1986); see also Pinole Point Props., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp.

43
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found that § 107 contained an express cost recovery right for
PRPs. 4 The courts allowed these actions under § 107 because to
hold otherwise would discourage PRPs from cleaning up their
contaminated sites, which would hinder CERCLA's puiToses of
prompt cleanup and assignment of financial liability. 5 These
courts examined the express language of § 107, stating that PRPs
under it "shall be liable for-(A) all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an
Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
46
person consistent with the national contingency plan" (NCP).
Even though courts used multiple legal theories to create this right
of recovery for PRPs under § 107, each court found the importance
of a right for PRPs to bring an action under the section. In 1985,
the Walls v. Waste Res. Corp.47 court noticed that "[c]ourt decisions have been virtually unanimous in holding that section
9607(a)(4)(B) creates a private right of action against section
9607(a) responsible parties for the recovery of necessary costs of
response incurred. 4 8 Therefore, the pre-SARA courts attempted to
further the purposes of prompt cleanup and assignment of liability
found in CERCLA by creating a § 107 right that allowed PRPs to
recover costs related to voluntary cleanups of hazardous sites.
B.

Enactment of SARA and§ 113(f)

In 1986 Congress enacted SARA, which contained § 113(f)
and expressly added to CERCLA a cause of action for

283, 287-89 (N.D. Cal. 1984); see also Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F.
Supp. 1135, 1141-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
"See id.
45 Id.
46

42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (2002).

47

Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985).

48

Id. at 318 (quotations omitted).
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contribution.49 After the passage of § 113(f), many courts
determined that no PRPs were able to sue under § 107's cost
recovery action and instead must sue under § 113(f)'s contribution
action. 0 The Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp.51 court
held that § 107 creates the right of contribution; however, § 113
governs and regulates such action.5 2 Courts followed the Supreme
Court's dicta in Key Tronic that §§ 107 and 113 provided similar
and overlapping remedies.5 3 Even the Fifth Circuit decision in
Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc.s4 relied on the dichotomy between §107 and § 113. ss
The Pinal Creek Group court stated that the joint and
several liability found within § 107 "entails a significant risk of
producing unfair results, and runs the risk of creating procedural
chaos" if used for joint PRPs.5 6 Some courts' main worry was that
a PRP sued under § 107 could then sue another PRP and recoup all
of its costs, thus defying logic.5 7 This possible windfall helped
solidify the § 113 mechanism of contribution between PRPs.

49

See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994).

50 See Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301-06

(9th Cir. 1997); see also United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d.
96, 103 (1st Cir. 1994); see also New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp.,
111 F.3d 1116, 1120-24 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Redwing Carriers, Inc. v.
Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Akzo
Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764-65 (7th Cir. 1994).
"' Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d 1298.
52

See id. at 1302.

53 Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994).

312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002), rev'd by Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs.,
Inc. 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
14

51 See id. at 683.
56

Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d at 1303.

57

Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d at 1121.
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However, the courts relied on the recovery right encompassed in
§ 107 to allow PRPs to bring a suit for contribution under § 113.58
C.

The Aviall Decision

In Aviall, Cooper Industries owned four Texas aircraft
maintenance properties until 1981 when they were sold to Aviall
Services. 59 Aviall operated this business for years before it
determined that both it and Cooper had contaminated the area
when petroleum and other hazardous substances had leaked into
the ground. 60 Aviall took responsibility and notified the state of the
contamination; however, neither the state nor the federal government facilitated or compelled a cleanup of the site. 61 The Texas
Natural Resource Conservation Commission threatened to sue
Aviall, but took no formal action. 62 Aviall once again showed
responsibility and initiated a cleanup of the contamination. 63 In
doing so, Aviall incurred approximately $5 million in cleanup
costs, and subsequently sold the properties to a third party. 64 Aviall
still remains contractually liable for the cleanup. 65 After selling the

58

See Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d at 1301-04; see also Halliburton NUS Corp.,

111 F.3d at 1120-24; see also Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94
F.3d 1489, 1496 (11 th Cir. 1996); see also United Techs. Corp. v. BrowningFerris Indus., 33 F.3d. 96, 103 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Akzo Coatings, Inc. v.
Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764-65 (7th Cir. 1994).
59

Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 157 (2004).

60

See id. at 163-64.

61

See id. at 164.

62

See id.

63

See id.

64 id.
65

See id.
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property, Aviall filed suit to recover a portion of the costs from
66

Cooper.

Aviall filed a joint § 107(a) and § 113(f)(1) claim, but later
amended the claim to a single claim under § 113.67 Aviall relied on
Fifth Circuit precedent "holding that a § 113 claim is a type of
§ 107 claim."' 8 The district court found that Aviall had abandoned
its §107 claim and granted Cooper summary judgment because
"Aviall had not been sued under § 106 or § 107.,,69 A divided panel
of the Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that § 113 is only
available to PRPs "during or following" a civil action. 70 On
rehearing en bane, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Aviall
was allowed to bring a § 113 contribution claim as a PRP
regardless of whether it has been subject72to a civil suit.7 The Fifth
Circuit relied on § 113's savings clause.
The Supreme Court granted review and held that "[a]
private party who has not been sued under CERCLA §§ 106 or 107
may not obtain contribution under § 113(f)(1) from other liable
parties. 73 The court looked at the plain meaning of "may" in the
§ 113 enabling clause and determined that a contribution action
under the section can only be filed during or following a civil
action.74 The Supreme Court also found that a §113(f)(3)(B)
action
75
government.
federal
the
with
settlement
after
is available

66

See id.

67

See id.

68

Id. at 164, n.4.

69

Id. at 157-58.

70

d. at 165.

"' See id.
72

See id.

73Id. at
74

158.

See id. at 166.
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This decision, however, left a gaping hole in CERCLA
recovery actions. Now a PRP can be liable under § 107, but cannot
seek recovery from other PRPs under § 113 unless it waits for a
civil action or reaches a settlement with the government. The Court
in Aviall did not decide the § 107 issue since it was not on review
from below. 76 However, the court did state that § 113's savings
clause did not diminish any independent contribution actions.
The Supreme Court previously stated in Key Tronic that "the
statute now expressly authorizes a cause of action for contribution
in § 113 and impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat overlapping remedy in § 107." 78 Nevertheless, the Aviall Court stated
that the "dictum in Key Tronic" was not compelling enough to
decide the § 107 issue there. 79 The Supreme Court has remanded
to decide whether Aviall may
the case back to the Fifth Circuit
80
successfully add a § 107 claim.
Justice Ginsburg's dissent relied primarily on the Key
Tronic decision. 81 Ginsburg stated that the majority and dissent in
that case disagreed whether the action for a PRP in § 107 was one
of express language or an implied contribution.8 2 However, she
stated her opinion that "no Justice expressed the slightest doubt
that § 107 indeed did enable a PRP to sue other covered persons
for reimbursement, in whole or in part, of cleanup costs the PRP
legitimately incurred., 83 Ginsburg also stated that the Court should
71

See id. at 163.

76

See id. at 168-171.

77

See id. at 166.

78

Key Tronic Corp., 511 U.S. at 816.

79

Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 170.

80

See id. at 171.

81

See id. at 172-74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

82

See id. at 172.
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have determined the § 107 issue because Aviall followed Fifth
84
Circuit precedent in asserting its §§ 107 and 113 claim in tandem.
Ginsburg also disagreed with the remand order stating that § 113
did not retract the prior judicial right that PRPs could recover
under § 107.85 This notion that a PRP has a § 107 right to recovery
has fueled numerous district court decisions, a split between the
circuits,6 and is currently up for review before the Supreme Court
8
again.
II.

WHY PRPs SHOULD BE ALLOWED RECOVERY FROM OTHER

PRPs UNDER § 107

Courts need to recognize a right in § 107 for those PRPs
that are unable to proceed with claims under § 113. Courts are
hindering the purposes that underlie CERCLA by denying these
PRPs' recovery. By limiting claims under § 113, PRPs are
dissuaded from conducting prompt cleanups, and others that
should be held liable will not be financially accountable for their
actions. The plain language of § 107 does not expressly preclude
PRPs from bringing an action under the statute. 88 Section 107
arguably creates either an express right of cost recovery in the
plain language, 89 or it creates an implied right of contribution for
84

1Id. at 173.

85

1Id. at 174.

86

See Atd. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 837 (8th Cir. 2006),

cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 1144 (Jan 19, 2007) (No. 06-562); E.I. DuPont De
Nemours and Co. v. United States 460 F.3d 515, 529 (3d Cir. 2006); see also
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., v. UGI Utilis., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 100 (2d Cir.
2005); see also Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1136,
1151 (D. Kan. 2006); see also Viacom, Inc., v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 2d 3,
9 (D.D.C. 2005); see also Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v.
Lake River Corp., 365 F. Supp. 2d 913, 917 (N.D. Ill. 2005); see also Vine St.
LLC v. Keeling, 362 F. Supp. 2d 754, 764 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
87

See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 423 F.3d at 94.

88 See id.
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PRPs. 9° Either reading of § 107 creates a right for PRPs to recover
from other PRPs. This pre-SARA right should persuade courts that
PRPs who may not proceed under § 113 may still seek an action
under§ 107.
The pre-SARA rights were not destroyed by the enactment
of SARA and still remain intact. The Supreme Court noted in
Aviall that § 113 did nothing to remove any other contribution
right found in CERCLA. 9 1 The Court would not decide if § 107
contained such a right, 92 but arguably the Court in the past has
stated that § 107 does contain some right for PRP recovery. 93 Some
courts believe that a § 107 action is unavailable to a PRP simply
because.joint and several liability imposed by the statute may
cause unjust results.94 A simple solution is to allow a defendant
PRP to file a § 113 counterclaim to remove any inequality, and
95
allowing the voluntary PRP to continue with their § 107 suit.
Therefore, it appears only logical that courts should revive the preSARA right that allows PRPs to recover costs under § 107, even if
joint and several liability is the only option, because of the
importance of this right.

89 See United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1265-69 (Del.
1986); see also United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,
260-62 (D.C. Mo. 1985); see also Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670
F. Supp. 913, 917-19 (N.D. Okla. 1987).

90 See Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 891-92 (9th Cir.
1986); see also Pinole Point Props., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp.
283, 290-92 (N.D. Cal. 1984); see also Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F.
Supp. 1135, 1144 (D.C. Pa. 1982).

91See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004).
92

See id.

93 See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994).

94 See, e.g., Elementis Chromium L.P. v. Coastal States Petroleum Co., 450 F.3d
607, 613 (5th Cir. 2006).
95 See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 100 (2d Cir.
2005).
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A.
The Purposes behind Enacting CERCLA Should Be
Furthered,Not Hindered
Denying PRPs the right to recover voluntary cleanup costs
would lie contrary to CERCLA's purposes of prompt cleanup and
apportionment of financial responsibility. 96 The Aviall case has a
chilling effect on any private party that wishes to conduct voluntary cleanups. Voluntary cleanups promote CERCLA's purpose by
providing prompt and efficient clean up of hazardous waste sites
resulting in a cleaner, safer environment. Allowing PRPs that
conduct voluntary cleanups the right to seek recovery also furthers
CERCLA's purpose of assigning financial responsibility to
responsible parties. 97 By removing PRPs' right to seek recovery,
courts have hindered a fundamental goal of CERCLA. 98 After
Aviall, PRPs will be reluctant to conduct voluntary cleanups
because they will be barred from recovering from others liable
parties. 99 Aviall hurts the best kind of PRPs; those who are socially
responsible, and who take the incentive to cleanup before the
government compels them to do so.
1. Prompt Cleanup of Hazardous Sites
Recall that Aviall Services contacted the government, and
that neither the state nor federal agencies would act to compel or
facilitate cleanup.°00 After the Aviall decision, those PRPs that are
not compelled to cleanup by the government or who settle, must
wait indefinitely if they ever want to recover any of their costs of
cleanup. The Viacom, Inc. v. United States court held that

96

See Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. Lake River Corp.,

365 F. Supp. 2d 913, 917-918 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
97

See Young v. United States, 394 F.3d 858, 862 (10th Cir. 2005).

98 See Viacom, Inc. v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 2d 3, 8 (D.C. 2005).
99 See id.
'00 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 157 (2004).
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"[w]ithout the ability to recover costs under § 107(a), these goals
would be frustrated because PRPs would be dissuaded from
voluntarily taking prompt action."' 01 The district court then went
on to state that unless § 107 relief was available to PRPs, the result
would motivate them to "follow the arduous litigation path that is
all too often the norm for involuntary cleanups. '' 02 Viacom Inc.
involved a cleanup of one of Viacom's facilities located in Bloomfield, New Jersey.' 0 3 This facility was run by Viacom's corporate
predecessor, Westinghouse Electric Corp., and was devoted to
working with electric lamps and their corresponding components. 10 4 While working with these items, Westinghouse developed
expertise in producing pure uranium, and Westinghouse was
subsequently asked to participate in the Manhattan Project, which
produced the first nuclear bomb. 10 5 The Bloomfield facility
processed uranium and yielded sixty-nine tons for military use.
Due to the nature of the project, a severe radiological contamination developed throughout the facility.' 0 7 This facility closed in
1986 and Westinghouse immediately began the decommissioning
process to reduce the radioactive levels.' 0 8 Viacom has incurred
costs of almost $30 million to correct the contamination contained
at this facility.' 0 9 In Viacom Inc. neither the federal nor state0
government compelled cleanup nor filed a civil action.''
101Viacom,

Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d at 8.

102 id.

"03See id. at 4.
104

See id.

105See

id.

1 Id.
See id.

107

108

See id.

109See id.
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Therefore, after Aviall, Viacom would be forced to incur all costs
even though Westinghouse and others were partially liable for the
contamination. However, the Viacom Inc. court realized that the
prompt cleanup of this site was a responsible undertaking that
limited the harmful effects of this contamination. The court held
that Viacom could recover cleanup costs under § 107.111
Courts should follow Viacom Inc. and other recent
decisions 1 2 which allows PRPs precluded from suit under § 113 to
recover under § 107.113 By allowing § 107 suits, current PRPs will
not have to face the decision of awaiting a civil suit or conducting
a voluntary cleanup. Slowing down the cleanup process could have
exponential harms on the public and environmental health and
safety. Viacom and other PRPs that have already conducted
voluntary cleanups should not be punished solely based on a 2004
decision that limited long-standing CERCLA jurisprudence. Courts
need to allow PRPs this § 107 right because to hold otherwise
would hinder CERCLA's goal of prompt cleanup and a safer
environment.
2. Apportioning Financial Responsibility
CERCLA's second main goal is to "encourage private
parties to assume the financial responsibility of cleanup by
allowing them to seek recovery from others."' 14 PRPs that are
precluded from recovery post-Aviall should be allowed to seek
recovery under § 107. Otherwise, they would be forced to assume
all of the financial responsibility, thus creating an unjust result and
110
See

id.

...
See id. at 9.
112

See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 100 (2nd

Cir. 2005); see also Raytheon Aircraft Co., v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 2d
1136, 1151 (D. Kan. May 26, 2006); see also Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of
Greater Chicago v. Lake River Corp., 365 F. Supp. 2d 913, 917 (N.D. I11.
2005);
see also Vine St. LLC v. Keeling, 362 F. Supp. 2d 754, 764 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
113Viacom,
114

Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d at 9.

FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 842, 847 (10th Cir. 1993).
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hindering the apportionment goal of CERCLA. If the Viacom Inc.
court rejected Viacom's § 107 claim, then Viacom would have
been precluded from assigning liability to other responsible parties.
Therefore, "allowing § 107(a) cost recovery actions to proceed
where a § 113(f) action is impossible gives effect to CERCLA's
purpose by encouraging voluntary cleanups while holding PRPs,
including those not undertaking voluntary action, accountable for
the response costs of their past activities." '15
Without a right to recover in § 107, many parties that
contribute to contamination will never be held liable if another
party conducts a voluntary cleanup without settling with or being
compelled by the government. In the case, Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. Lake River Corp. (Metro
Water)," 6 Metro Water was an owner of a parcel of land located
near Chicago, Illinois." 7 Metro Water had granted a long term
lease to Lake River Corp., who operated the property as an8
industrial chemical mixing, packaging, and storage facility."
While Lake River Corp. operated the plant, various chemicals were
spilled, which caused soil and groundwater contamination." 9 If
compelled by the government, Metro Water would be a liable PRP
as an owner under § 107(a), and Lake River Corp. would also be a
liable PRP as an operator under the same section.' Instead, Metro
Water conducted a voluntary cleanup of the site as a responsible
owner and suffered extensive economic loss. 12 1 Metro Water's

"5 Viacom Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d at 8.
116

Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. Lake River Corp. 365

F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Ill.
2005).

17 See id. at 915.
118 See

id.

119 See

id.

120

See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2005).

121

See Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 365 F. Supp. 2d at
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claim was precluded under § 113 because it was a voluntary
cleanup with no civil action.1 22 Therefore, unless the court found
that Metro Water had a § 107 cause of action, Metro Water would
be forced to absorb the whole cost of cleanup even though it was
not the source of the contamination. Thankfully, the district court
allowed Metro Water to recover against Lake River Corp. under
§ 107 because "[a]ny other outcome would seem to lie contrary to
the general purposes of CERCLA." 123 Courts must allow PRPs to
bring claims under § 107 to remove unjust results that allow the
other contributing tortfeasor to walk away free of liability.
If courts continue to allow PRPs only to sue under § 113,
many Superfund sites will remain contaminated because parties
will wait for government action. 124 Most responsible parties prefer
conducting a voluntary cleanup of their site rather than being
compelled by the government because time and money are used
more efficiently. Furthermore, after Aviall, a party must wait for
suit or incur massive cleanup costs without the possibility of
compensation from other liable parties. This allows the other liable
parties to assume no liability even though they may factually hold
a majority. Hazardous waste sites are dangerous and need to be
cleaned, but post-Aviall § 113 sends a loud message that only those
sites pursued by the government are dangerous enough to be
cleaned. This idea seems to stand contrary to the enactment of
CERCLA. Unless PRPs may bring a § 107 action when they are
unavailable to a § 113 claim, the important purposes underling
CERCLA will be lost, and responsible PRPs that conduct cleanups
will meet tension and unjust results in the courts. The main goals
of CERCLA begin to answer the first question left after Aviall: a
PRP can recover costs under § 107 because barring a PRPs' suit
would be unjust and hinder the purposes of the Act.

'
'

22

See id. at 917.

23

Id. at 918.

124

Following post-SARA and pre-Aviall precedent.
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B.
Section 107 Plain Language Encompasses a Right of
Action
The Supreme Court relied on the plain language of § 113 to
remove the contribution right from these PRPs that voluntarily
cleanup; therefore, courts should rely on the plain language of
§ 107 to restore PRPs' right of recovery. CERCLA § 107(a) makes
owners, operators, transporters and manufactures of hazardous
waste liable for "any other necessary costs of response incurred by
[the government or] any other person consistent with the national
contingency plan." 125 CERCLA's definition of "person" encompasses all individuals, associate, corporate, and government
entities. 126 Therefore, all PRPs covered by this Article fall squarely
within the broad "any other person" definition used in
CERCLA.127 "Although PRPs are not explicitly named in § 107(a),
there seems to be no reason why they would be excluded from the
provision that allows recovery for any' person,
unless that right was
28
provided for elsewhere in the statute."'
These courts are split, however, on what to call this right
found by pre-SARA and some post-Aviall courts allowing PRPs to
maintain a claim under § 107.29 Courts should always start with
125 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
126

42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2005); CERCLA § 101(21).

127

PRPs that would be liable under § 107 if sued, but currently unable to have a

claim under § 113. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423
F.3d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Raytheon Aircraft Co., v. United States,
435 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1145-51 (D. Kan. 2006); see also Metro. Water
Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. Lake River Corp., 365 F. Supp. 2d 913,
917 (N.D. 111. 2005); see also Vine St. LLC v. Keeling, 362 F. Supp. 2d 754,
764 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
128

Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 918.

129

See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 423 F.3d at 100; see also Wickland Oil

Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 891-92 (9th Cir. 1986); see also
Raytheon Aircraft Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d at 1151; see also Viacom, Inc., 404 F.
Supp. 2d at 9; see also Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 365
F. Supp. 2d at 917; see also Vine St. LLC, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 764; see also Sand

232 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL 14
the plain language of the statute, and some of the courts, including
Con Ed and Viacom, Inc., found an express right of cost recovery
based on the plain language found in § 107. ° However, if a court
does not conclude that the plain language of § 107 permits recovery by PRPSs then it should determine if there as an implied right
of contribution within, such as the Metro Water court. 131 While
either an express cost recovery right or an implied contribution
right allow for PRP recovery against other PRPs under § 107, they
each contain downfalls. More importantly, both rights acknowledge that courts believe that barring a PRP from recovery is not a
viable solution and that some remedy should be made available.
1. An Express Right of Cost Recovery Available to PRPs
The express right to cost recovery is the most straightforward, because the language of § 107 does nothing to restrict
actions from PRPs. There is no limiting language with regards to
actions by PRPs found in § 107; unlike the language "may seek
contribution .. during or following any civil action" from § 113
that the Supreme Court used to limit some PRP actions in Aviall. 32
On the contrary, there appears to be no logical reason why PRPs
would be excluded from § 107 cost recovery actions, which allow

Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913, 917-19 (N.D. Okl. 1987);
see also United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1265-69 (D.
Del. 1986); see also United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,
260-62 (D.C. Mo. 1985); see also Pinole Point Props., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 290-92 (N.D. Cal. 1984; see also Philadelphia v.
Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1144 (D.C. Pa. 1982).
130

See Consol. Edison Co. of New York, 423 F.3d at 100; see also Viacom Inc.,

404 F. Supp. 2d at 8-9; see also Wickland Oil Terminals, 792 F.2d at 890-92;
see also Pinole Point Props., Inc., 596 F. Supp. at 289-92; see also Stepan
Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1142-44.
131See

Metro Water Reclamation Dist. of Chicago, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 917; see

also Sand Springs Home, 670 F. Supp. at 916-17; New Castle County, 642 F.
Supp. at 1265-69; see also Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 260-62.
132

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2005). See Cooper Indus., Inc., v. Aviall Servs., Inc.,

543 U.S. 157, 157 (2004).

REBIRTH OF CERCLA §107

2007]

233

recovery for "any person."' 33 The Con Ed court found no basis for
a distinction between innocent parties and parties that would be
held liable under § 107 if sued. 134 The decision in Atlantic
Research Corp. v. United States' 35 followed the Second Circuit in
holding that "it no longer makes sense to view § 113 as a liable
party's exclusive remedy."' 136 Recently in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Supreme Court expressed that
"any" was all encompassing language. 137 The language of § 107
allows any person the right to seek a cost recovery action against a
PRP as long as they have incurred necessary costs from a cleanup
action consistent with the NCP. It appears that the limiting
language of the statute applies only to parties that have not
incurred recovery costs stemming from a cleanup.' 38 Furthermore,
all PRPs that would have § 107 claims under this Article have
incurred necessary costs of response by voluntarily cleaning up
contaminated waste sites.
As Aviall is on remand, the Northern District Court of
Texas recently relied on Cooper's argument that "any other person" excludes PRPs. 139 However, this language appears directly
after costs incurred by the "United States Government or a State or
an Indian tribe."' 140 This "other" does not directly limit actions by
133

Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 918.

134Consol.
135Atl.
36

1

Edison Co. of New York, 423 F.3d at 99.

Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006).

Id. at 834.

131Massachusetts

v. EPA, 2007 WL 957332, *18-20 (U.S., Apr. 2, 2007)
(holding that carbon dioxide is encompassed under the Clean Air Act as "any"
air pollutant).
138See

Young v. United States, 394 F.3d 858, 865 (10th Cir. 2005) (requiring
plaintiffs to prove necessary response costs had been incurred).
139Aviall

Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., LLC, 2006 WL 2263305, 6 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 8, 2006).
14'42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (2005).
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PRPs. The Atlantic Research Corp. court also "held that 'any other
person' means any person other than the statutorily enumerated
14 1
'United States Government or a State of an Indian tribe."'
Therefore, the courts should examine CERCLA as a whole. 142 By
examining the language and purpose as a whole, courts should
conclude that PRPs should not be precluded from § 107 suits because the "any other person" language is broad and non-exclusive.
Even though an express cost recovery right available to
PRPs seems like a simple solution, there are complex problems
with joint and several liability used under § 107. Federal common
law determined that § 107 actions are for joint and several liability
to make enforcement easier for government agencies.1 43 Some
post-SARA, pre-Aviall cases held that PRPs could only state
claims under § 113's contribution because of this scheme of
liability found in § 107.144 This conflict will be discussed more in
Part II. C. of this Article, but courts should remember that the plain
language of § 107 does not limit PRPs from seeking an express
cost recovery action. Therefore, PRPs that conduct voluntary
cleanups should not be barred from § 107 actions, when they are
already precluded from seeking a remedy in § 113.
2. An Implied Right of Contribution Found in § 107
Courts have determined that the implied right to
contribution existed since the enactment of CERCLA. 5 This
implied right was judicially determined by multiple pre-SARA
courts. 146 In a recent decision, Vine Street LLC v. Keeling,147 the
141At.

Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 835, (citing Control Data
Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 936, n. 9 (8th Cir. 1995)).
142

See Aviall Servs., Inc, 2006 WL 2263305 at 6.

143See

United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (Ohio 1983).

144See

Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1303 (9th

Cir. 1997).
145See

e.g. Vine St. LLC v. Keeling, 362 F. Supp. 2d 754, 763 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
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court explained that § 113 was enacted to defeat "the divisibility
defense to joint and several liability" that was "frequently invoked
in cost recovery actions brought under § 107(a)."' 148 The court
further explained that § 113 was created because it offers pro rata
liability, contrasting the joint and several liability found in
§ 107.149 The court determined that an implied right existed prior
to § 113 because the section "contains an 'enabling' clause,
creating the specific cause of action, and a 'savings' clause, preserving other means of seeking contribution."' 50 The Vine Street LLC
court held that "[o]ne of those other means of seeking contribution
is under Section 107(a)."' 15 1 The court reasoned that § 113 "is
specifically worded to create a specific cause of action," and § 107
152
"is much more broadly worded and allows a variety of claims."'
The court held that § 107 encompasses a contribution
claim for
53
costs that PRPs incur during a voluntary cleanup.'
Courts like the term "contribution" because claims involving multiple PRPs are claims between joint tortfeasors. The courts
use the Restatement Second of Torts to determine that contribution
is appropriate when one PRP has incurred costs that exceed their
share of liability. 54 If courts determine that § 107 does contain an
See Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913, 917-19 (N.D.

146

Okla. 1987); see also United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258,
1258-69; see also United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,
260-62.
147

Vine St. LLC, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 763.

148

Id. (quoting Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apts., 94 F.3d 1489, 1513

(Ala. 1996)).
149 Id.

15o Id. See Cooper Indus., Inc., v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166-67
(2004).

"' Vine St. LLC, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 763.
152

Id.

153

See id.
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implied contribution right for PRPs, precluded from § 113 actions,
there will be correct apportionment of liability between the
culpable parties. This determination will lead to just results and
promote CERCLA cleanups. However, in Aviall, the Supreme
Court appeared insightful on the § 107 implied contribution right
question. 55 The Court stated that it has "visited the subject of
implied contribution rights of contribution before," ' 156 and within
those cases the court did not find an implied right of
contribution. 57 Therefore, it appears that an implied right to
contribution in § 107 may fail if the question returns to the
Supreme Court.
In Key Tronic, the Supreme Court stated that "§ 107
unquestionably provides a cause of action for private parties to
seek recovery of cleanup costs.' ' 158 Ginsburg stated in her dissent
in Aviall that the whole court in Key Tronic agreed that § 107
allowed a PRP to bring suit.159 However, the Key Tronic court
could not agree whether this right was express or implied. 160 The
courts that have ruled on the matter since Aviall have not
unanimously decided if this right is express cost recovery or
implied contribution,' 6' but then again neither did the pre-SARA
154

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

155

See Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 170-71.

156

Id. at 171 (citing Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,

886A (1979).

638-647 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Trans. Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 90-99 (1981)).
157

158

See id.
Key Tronic Corp., 511 U.S. 809, 818 (1994). The Supreme Court in Aviall

stated that this language was dicta.
'59

See Cooper Indus, Inc., 543 U.S. at 172.

160

See id.

161Compare Consol.

Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F. 3d 90, 100

(2d Cir. 2005), and Viacom, Inc. v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 2d 3, 9 (D.C.
2005) with Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. Lake River
Corp., 365 F. Supp. 2d 913, 917 (N.D. I11.2005).
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courts. 16 The question of whether § 107 includes an express right
for PRPs or an implied right of contribution is a very difficult one
63
to dissect; that even the Supreme Court could not conclude.'
However, a simple disagreement on the naming of the right should
not keep PRPs from rightful claims under § 107.
All of the above courts did find the importance of allowing
164
PRPs to bring suit under § 107 for costs they have incurred.
Looking at the plain language of § 107 helps to further answer
questions one, three and four left open by Aviall: 1) a PRP can
recover costs under § 107 because of the importance of the judicial
right found in the statute; 2) either a PRP can pursue an express
cost recovery action under § 107(a) under joint and several liability
because of the plain language in the statute; or 3) there is an
implied right of contribution under § 107(a) that allows PRPs
precluded from § 113 to bring suit under the section. Either an
express cost recovery right or an implied right of contribution
acknowledges the importance that the courts find in allowing a
PRP to bring a claim for recovery.
C.

Addressing the Problem with Joint and Several Liability

During CERCLA's infancy, the federal common law determined that § 107 actions are for joint and several liability. 165 This
joint and several liability allows the plaintiff in the suit to recover

162 Compare Sand

Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913, 916-19

(N.D. Okla. 1987), and United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258,
1265-69 (Del. 1986), and United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162, 258-62 (D.C. Mo. 1985), with Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco,
Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 891-92 (9th Cir. 1986), and Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem.
Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1144 (Pa. 1982), and Pinole Point Props., Inc. v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 290-92 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
163See

Key Tronic Corp., 511 U.S. at 816.

Pre-SARA, Key Tronic, and post-Aviall courts have all found this right in
§ 107(a)(4)(B).
164

165See

1983).

United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio
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all costs from one liable tortfeasor, and then allows the tortfeasor
to bring suit against other joint tortfeasors to recover costs it
incurred for which the original defendant was not liable. 66 Many
of the opponents of allowing PRPs' cost recovery actions under
§ 107 state that joint and several liability will create unjust
results. 167 In 2006, the Fifth Circuit held that when one PRP brings
68
suit against another, joint and several liability is inappropriate.
Many courts have relied on the Eleventh Circuit's holding in
Redwing Carriers,Inc. v. SaralandApartments that when a liable
party sues another liable party it is not a cost recovery action under
§ 107, but it is a contribution action under § 113.169 Redwing
Carriersalso stated that under § 107 the rule is joint and several
liability, while under § 113 response costs may be allocated
between liable parties. 70 These courts determined that if PRPs are
allowed to recover jointly and severally, they can recover 100
percent of their costs.' 7 1 Courts have denied PRPs' claims under
§ 107 and ignored the purposes and plain language of CERCLA
based on this issue alone. However, these unjust results are easily
overcome.
First, section 107 does not compel 100 percent recovery but
instead permits recovery of "any other necessary costs of
response."' 172 Therefore, any windfall can be reduced by PRP

166

See RESTATEMENT

167

See Elementis Chromium L.P. v. Coastal States Petroleum Co., 45 F.3d 607,

(SECOND) OF TORTS §

886A (1979).

613 (5th Cir. 2006).
168

See id. This is the same Circuit that decided Aviall. It is odd, however, that

the court neither mentioned Aviall, Con Ed, nor any other recent court holding
that PRPs have a rightful claim under § 107.
169

See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apts., 94 F.3d 1489, 1513 (11 th Cir.

1996).
170

1

See id.
See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 100 n.9 (2d

Cir. 2005).
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plaintiffs only attempting to recover the correct shares. Second, as
a check against overreaching PRP plaintiffs, a defendant PRP to a
§ 107 cost recovery suit may bring a § 113 counterclaim.' 73 This
solution apportions pro rata liability to the suit and becomes essentially a contribution action. Defendants to a PRPs' § 107 action can
file a § 113 counterclaim because they have met the Aviall § 113
requirements of an ongoing civil action. 174 The Eleventh Circuit
has allowed these counterclaims in a case where an engineering
firm filed a § 107 cost recovery claim for cleanup against the city
of Miami and the city counterclaimed for a contribution action
under § 113.175 Courts have acknowledged that when defendant
PRPs are faced with §§ 107 and 113 claims, the "generally
corresponding CERCLA counterclaims" include § 113.176 The Con
Ed court also held that there is "no bar precluding a person sued
under section 107(a) from bringing a counterclaim under section
113(f)(1) for offsetting contribution against the plaintiff
volunteer
177
who, if sued would be liable under section 107(a)"'
This solution appears to be the most logical-allowing
PRPs that conduct voluntary cleanups to undertake a § 107 cost
recovery claim and allow their defendants to counterclaim under
§ 113. This solution adheres to the plain language of § 107 allowing cost recovery actions to PRPs, and simultaneously creates
contribution recovery between the parties. Thus, there will be
correct apportionment of recovery costs, and plaintiff PRPs can
continue their § 107 claims. The counterclaim solution helps to
answer the fist three questions after Aviall, it allows: 1) a PRP to
still recover costs under § 107(a)(4)(B); 2) a PRP to pursue a
172

AtI. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 835 (8th Cir. 2006)

(citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607).
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See id.
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See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 423 F.3d at 100, n.9.

See Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. N. Miami, 283 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11 th Cir.
2002).
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Dent v. Beazer Materials. & Servs., Inc., 156 F.3d. 523, 527 (4th Cir. 1998).
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Consol. Edison Co. of New York, 423 F.3d at 100 n.9.
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§ 107(a) action for joint and several liability, but once a defendant
PRP files a § 113 counterclaim the suit becomes a contribution
action; and 3) a PRP to pursue a cost recovery action under
§ 107(a) in the form of joint and several liability without the
appearance of inequality.
Section 113 Does Not Remove the § 107 Right

D.

The enactment of § 113 did nothing to remove the preSARA judicial right of recovery for PRPs under § 107. Section 113
contains a savings clause that the Aviall Court decided "does
nothing to 'diminish' any cause(s) of action for contribution that
may exist independently of § 113(f)(1).' 178 The Supreme Court's
dicta in Key Tronic stated that the SARA provisions were generally
enacted to endorse the judicial decisions of the time, and that § 113
expressly recognized a cause of action under § 107.179 Courts have
analyzed the legislative history of § 113 and determined that
Congress only intended to "clarify" and "confirm" the pre-SARA
case law.' 80 This pre-SARA case law contained the right for PRPs
to bring recovery actions under § 107.181 These pre-SARA rights
survived the passage of SARA because of Section 113's savings
clause and legislative history.

178

Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 147, 158 (2004).

179

See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994).

180 Viacom,

Inc. v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 2d 3, 9 (D.C. 2005) (quoting

H.R.Rep. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 79 (1985)).
181 See

Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 891-92 (9th Cir.

1986); see also Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913, 91719 (N.D. Okla. 1987); see also United States v. New Castle County, 642 F.
Supp. 1258, 1265-69 (Del. 1986); see also United States v. Conservation Chem.
Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 260-62 (D. Mo. 1985); see also Pinole Point Props., Inc.
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 290-92 (N.D. Cal. 1984); see also
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1144 (D.C. Pa. 1982).
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1. Section 113 Savings Clause
The Supreme Court held in Aviall that the § 113 savings
clause did not diminish any other contribution right among PRPs
located elsewhere in CERCLA. 11 2 The express language of the
savings clause states: "[n]othing in this subsection shall diminish
the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the
absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section
9607 of this title."' 83 The Supreme Court stated that the savings
clause did not change its conclusion that § 113 actions are limited
to PRPs who had ongoing or concluded civil actions.' 84 However,
the Court did explain that this savings clause provides that § 113 is
not the exclusive action for contribution by a PRP under
CERCLA.185 Therefore, it is fair to infer that the § 113 savings
clause did not destroy the pre-SARA § 107 right allowing PRPS to
recover costs sustained by a voluntary cleanup.
Prior to Aviall, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that § 107
did contain a right of recovery in Key Tronic. The Court stated that
"[o]ther SARA provisions, moreover, appeared to endorse the
judicial decisions recognizing a cause of action under § 107 by
presupposing that such an action existed."' 186 The Court also stated
that § 113 "expressly authorizes a cause of action for contribution"
and § 107 "impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat overlapping remedy." 87 These statements lead to the natural conclusion
that the Supreme Court does believe that there is some right for
PRPs in § 107, and this right was not removed by enacting § 113.
Ginsburg stated in the Aviall dissent that if the right existed before
§ 113(f)(1) and was not encompassed in § 113(f)(1), then the right
182

See Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 166.

183 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (2005).
184

See Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 166.

185

See id. at 167.

186

Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994).
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must still lie in § 107(a). 188 Ginsburg also relied on Key Tronic

stating that the entire Court was in agreement that § 107 "unquestionably provides a cause of action for [PRPs] to seek recovery of
cleanup costs.' ' 189 Ginsburg's dissent in Aviall did not revisit the

§ 107 issue because "[f]ederal courts, prior to the enactment of
§ 113(f)(1), had correctly held that PRPs could recover a proportionate share
of their costs in actions for contribution against other
90
,1

PRPs."

After Aviall, courts have attempted to revive this preSARA right for those PRPs that are unable to bring suit under
§ 113. The decision in Raytheon Aircraft went against Tenth
Circuit general precedent that PRPs could only pursue and action
under § 113.191 The court relied on the fact the "savings clause
preserve[d] all preexisting state and federal rights of action for
contribution, [and] the implied right of § 107(a) remains open to a
certain subset of plaintiffs."1' 92 The court found that the Circuit had
expressly recognized that it had not decided whether a PRP, that
cannot state a claim under § 113, may assert a claim under § 107
instead. 193 The court determined that since the plaintiff PRP was
barred from recovery under § 113 the plaintiff's contribution
action under § 107(a)(4)(B) was still valid because the right was
not encompassed by § 113.194

188See

Cooper Indus., Inc., 543 U.S. at 174.

189 Id. at 172 (quoting Key Tronic Corp., 511 U.S. at 818).
190 Id. at 174 (quoting Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677,
687 (5th Cir. 2002)).
'9'See

Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1138-39
(D. Kan. 2006).
192

Id. at 1148-49.

193See id. at 1146: see also Morrison Enter. v. McShares, Inc., 302 F.3d 1127,

1135 (10th Cir. 2002).
194

See Raytheon Aircraft Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d at 1151.
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Modem courts have upheld CERCLA fundamentals, that
the § 113 savings clause kept the pre-SARA common law right
alive in § 107 for those that cannot seek recovery under § 113. This
subset of plaintiffs corresponds directly to those PRPs that are the
subject of this Article. These PRPs should be allowed to sue under
their § 107 recovery right because the Supreme Court stated the
§ 113 savings clause did not diminish it.' 95 Courts now need to
revive the § 107 recovery right.
2. Legislative History of § 113
The legislative history for § 113 is not extremely clear, but
courts do agree that "Congress intended to 'clarify' and 'confirm'
rather than curtail, the right of contribution that federal courts had
previously found implied" in § 107.196 Senator Stafford predicted
that § 113 would "remove any doubts as to the right of contribution."' 97 Looking at other subsections of § 113, the legislative
history for the jurisdiction subsection 198 states specifically that
courts will have jurisdiction in "[a]n action under section 107 to
recover response costs or damages or for contribution or indemnification." 199 This statement leads to the conclusion that Congress
knew of the common law contribution right contained in § 107 and
intended not to disrupt that right when fashioning § 113. The
"paramount significance for present purposes is that Congress, in
enacting SARA, sought to codify the case law." 200 Therefore, the

195
See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004).
196

Viacom, Inc. v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 2d 3, 9 (D.C. 2005) (quoted in

H.R.Rep. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 79).
"' S. REP. NO. 99-11, at 44 (1985).
198 See 42 U.S.C.

§ 9613(b) (2005).

'99 H.R. REP. NO. 99-253, pt. 5, at 25 (1985).
200

United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d. 96, 100 (1st Cir.

1994).
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pre-SARA § 107 recovery right should be embraced by the courts
and PRPs should be allowed to seek a claim under this right.
Pre-Aviall courts determined that PRPs could not file a
single § 107 claim because the claims would be quixotic. 20 These
courts were worried that § 107's six-year statute of limitations
would swallow § 113(f)'s three-year statute of limitations. 20 2 This
is the main reason that the pre-Aviall courts determined that §§ 107
and 113 regulate a PRPs' right of contribution together; finding
§ 107 creates the right and § 113 provides the mechanics of the
claim.2 0 3 The Aviall decision limited the amount of PRPs that may
bring suit under § 113. Now, post Aviall some district courts are
following precedent that states PRPs still may not pursue an action
under § 107.04 However, the Con Ed court distinguished its prior
holding in Bedford Affiliates because the later case dealt with the
plaintiff spending funds to comply with two consent orders, while
the former dealt with voluntary cleanups. 205 The Con Ed court
reasoned that Bedford was precluded from action under § 107
because a § 113 contribution claim was available and Bedford had
already been found liable for 5 percent of the necessary response
CoStS. 206 Currently, if courts follow the Con Ed reasoning there will

201

See United Techs. Corp., 33 F.3d at 103; see also Redwing Carriers, Inc. v.

Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11 th Cir. 1996); see also Pinal Creek
Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301-04 (9th Cir. 1997); see
also New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1120-24 (3d
Cir. 1997); see also Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 423-24 (2d Cir.
1998).
202

See United Techs. Corp., 33 F.3d at 101.

203

See Pinal Creek Group, 118 F.3d at 1301-02.

204

See Mercury Mall Assocs., Inc. v. Nick's Mkt., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 2d 513,

520 (E.D. Va. 2005); see also Blue Tee Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 2005 WL
1532955, at 3-4 (W.D. Mo. June 27, 2005); see also City of Waukeshaw v.
Viacom Int'l, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1027-28 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
205

See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 101 (2d

Cir. 2005).
206

Id. at 102.
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no longer be a discrepancy because only PRPs that cannot maintain
a claim under § 113 may bring a § 107 recovery action.
Therefore, the § 113 savings clause and the legislative
history behind the statute did not remove the common law claim
under § 107. Courts should allow PRPs to regain their pre-SARA
§ 107 right for recovery. Section 113's legislative history and
savings clause help to answer question one and five left open by
Aviall: 1) a PRP that completes voluntary cleanups may still
recover costs under § 107(a)(4)(B), because 2) the pre-SARA
judicial right was clarified and not diminished by the enactment of
§ 113.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Aviall created a formidable limit on
CERCLA § 113 actions that will arguably preclude many PRPs
from pursuing voluntary cleanup. The Court, however, left open
the possibility of a cause of action in § 107. Many courts after the
Aviall decision have used § 107 to fashion a remedy. These courts
are correct in their judgments and other courts should continue to
follow.
The main reason § 107 should be open to those parties that
voluntarily clean up hazardous waste sites is because to deny them
the right would defy the purposes of CERCLA. CERCLA was
created so that those parties that contaminated the land and water
with hazardous waste would be held financially responsible.
CERCLA was also created to ensure that hazardous waste sites
were cleaned quickly and properly. If courts refuse to allow any
recovery to good PRPs that clean up hazardous sites quickly and
voluntarily, courts will dissuade many others from cleaning up at
all. This will force those willing to remediate to wait for
government action, which may take a very long time. 207 Therefore,
courts need to allow a § 107 action for PRPs that if sued would be
liable under § 107, but currently are unable to bring suit under §
113.

207

Government action may never happen at some sites.
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Courts should even go a step further and find an express
cost recovery right for PRPs in the plain language of
§ 107(a)(4)(B). PRPs are encompassed in the statutory term "any
other person," and if they have already voluntarily cleaned up a
hazardous site they have incurred response costs that they should
be allowed to recover. The Supreme Court had an opportunity to
decide if § 107 contained an express right of cost recovery or an
implied common law right of contribution, but it could not reach a
decision. If courts would allow a plaintiff PRP a cost recovery
right under § 107, then defendant PRPs could counterclaim under
§ 113. This solution will serve justice to all PRPs because plaintiffs
will be allowed to recover and the claim will take the form of a
contribution action, thus apportioning appropriate liability to each
party. Allowing counterclaims follows the plain language of § 107
allowing PRPs to seek recovery.
As the Supreme Court was limiting PRPs' rights in Aviall,
it did not slam the door. The Court held that the savings clause in
§ 113 did not remove any other contribution rights found in
CERCLA. Arguably, the only other contribution right is the
implied right found in § 107(a)(4)(B) by the pre-SARA courts. A
majority of circuits, pre-SARA, stated that PRPs must be allowed
to recover under § 107 to further the interests of CERCLA.
Congress enacted SARA intending not to destroy the § 107
common law right, but rather to clarify and confirm it. After
SARA was enacted many circuits and the Supreme Court altered
their holdings so that the PRP's right stemmed from § 107, while
§ 113 provided guidance and a mechanism for the claim. Aviall
destroyed the § 113 claim to those parties that had not been subject
to a civil suit, but arguably Aviall and § 113 left open the § 107
implied contribution right. Therefore, courts that will not accept an
express cost recovery right in § 107 should now allow those PRPs
who are unable to bring suit under §113 to rest their case on the
implied right found in § 107.
Therefore, this article addresses all questions left open by
Avial. First, a PRP may still recover costs under § 107(a)(4)(B)
because to hold otherwise would hinder the purposes of CERCLA,
create unjust results for those PRPs that conduct voluntary
cleanups, and disregard the plain language of § 107 that allows
suits by PRPs. Second, PRPs may rightfully pursue a § 107(a) cost
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recovery action for joint and several liability because a § 113
counterclaim would remove any problem of inequality. Third,
allowing defendant PRPs to counterclaim removes the need to find
an implied right of contribution under § 107(a), and allows PRPs to
bring cost recovery actions under the statute. Finally, the preSARA judicial rights survived the passage of § 113 because of the
section's savings clause, legislative history, and many courts'
reliance that § 107 contained the right, while § 113 provided only a
framework for enforcement.
In conclusion, courts should resurrect PRP's right to
recovery found in § 107. PRPs that conduct voluntary remediation
should be compensated for their work and responsible actions.
Congress enacted CERCLA to make polluters liable for their
actions, and a good way to invoke legal and environmental
responsibility is for these parties to willingly pay for cleanup even
though other parties may be partially at fault. When parties make
this type of monetary sacrifice for the health and well-being of
everyone, they should not be precluded from recovery solely
because the government did not bring a claim. In the wake of
Aviall, courts need to breathe new life into PRP's right to recovery
in § 107.

